Thoughts on using quantum randomness to harden RSA key generation when entropy sucks!
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Hey folks, I’m working on a project idea and wanted to sanity-check it with people who actually know crypto better than me. We know RSA key generation depends heavily on good randomness, and that in real systems (VMs, embedded devices, early boot, etc.) entropy can be pretty terrible. That’s led to real-world failures like repeated primes and shared moduli in the past. Instead of replacing RSA or jumping straight to post-quantum stuff, the idea here is simpler: what if we just make RSA’s randomness assumption less fragile? The plan is to simulate: A deliberately low-entropy / broken classical RNG A simulated quantum RNG (qubit superposition + measurement) A hybrid entropy source, basically XOR-mixing the two Then compare things like entropy, collision rates, and bias between: bad CRNG QRNG hybrid CRNG + QRNG This is all simulation-based (no real QRNG hardware), and I’m not modifying RSA itself — just looking at whether hybrid entropy helps when classical entropy is degraded. I’m mainly looking for feedback on: Is this idea already “obvious” or well-covered in literature? Are there flawed assumptions here? What tests or attacks would make this more convincing? Anything important I’m missing? Appreciate any thoughts — even if the answer is “this won’t work and here’s why.” submitted by /u/Slow-Dependent-1309 [link] [comments]