Quantum Resource Analysis of Low-Round Keccak/SHA-3 Preimage Attack: From Classical 2^57.8 to Quantum 2^28.9 using Qiskit Modeling
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Quantum Physics arXiv:2512.14759 (quant-ph) [Submitted on 15 Dec 2025] Title:Quantum Resource Analysis of Low-Round Keccak/SHA-3 Preimage Attack: From Classical 2^57.8 to Quantum 2^28.9 using Qiskit Modeling Authors:Ramin Rezvani Gilkolae View a PDF of the paper titled Quantum Resource Analysis of Low-Round Keccak/SHA-3 Preimage Attack: From Classical 2^57.8 to Quantum 2^28.9 using Qiskit Modeling, by Ramin Rezvani Gilkolae View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract:This paper presents a hardware-conscious analysis of the quantum acceleration of the classical 3-round Keccak-256 preimage attack using Grover's Algorithm. While the theoretical quantum speed-up from T_cl=2^{57.8} (classical) to T_qu = 2^{28.9} (quantum) is mathematically sound, the practical implementation overhead is so extreme that attacks remain wholly infeasible in both resource and runtime dimensions. Using Qiskit-based circuit synthesis, we derive that a 3-round Keccak quantum oracle requires: 9,600 Toffoli gates (with uncomputation for reversibility); 3,200 logical qubits (1,600 state + 1,600 auxiliary); 7.47 * 10^{13} total 2-qubit gates (full Grover search); 3.2 million physical qubits (with quantum error correction)PROHIBITIVE; 0.12 years (43 days) to 2,365+ years execution time, depending on machine assumptions. These barriers -- particularly the physical qubit requirements, circuit depth, and error accumulation -- render the quantum attack infeasible for any foreseeable quantum computer. Consequently, SHA-3 security is not threatened by quantum computers for preimage attacks. We emphasize the critical importance of hardware-aware complexity analysis in quantum cryptanalysis: the elegant asymptotic theory of Grover's Algorithm hides an engineering overhead so prohibitive that the quantum approach becomes infeasible from both resource and implementation perspectives. Subjects: Quantum Physics (quant-ph); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2512.14759 [quant-ph] (or arXiv:2512.14759v1 [quant-ph] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2512.14759 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Ramin Rezvani [view email] [v1] Mon, 15 Dec 2025 17:12:43 UTC (16 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View a PDF of the paper titled Quantum Resource Analysis of Low-Round Keccak/SHA-3 Preimage Attack: From Classical 2^57.8 to Quantum 2^28.9 using Qiskit Modeling, by Ramin Rezvani GilkolaeView PDFHTML (experimental)TeX Source view license Current browse context: quant-ph new | recent | 2025-12 Change to browse by: cs cs.CR References & Citations INSPIRE HEP NASA ADSGoogle Scholar Semantic Scholar export BibTeX citation Loading... BibTeX formatted citation × loading... Data provided by: Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv (What is alphaXiv?) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers (What is CatalyzeX?) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub (What is DagsHub?) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub (What is GotitPub?) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face (What is Huggingface?) Links to Code Toggle Papers with Code (What is Papers with Code?) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast (What is ScienceCast?) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate (What is Replicate?) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces (What is Spaces?) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI (What is TXYZ.AI?) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower (What are Influence Flowers?) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender (What is CORE?) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs. Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)