The Energy Problems Behind Turkey’s Incursions In Northern Syria

Despite being longtime patrons of the Syrian factionthat would ultimately overthrow the Baathist regime of Bashar Al Assad in Syria, Turkey has long had to deal with an uneasy balance of factions in the region.AFP via Getty ImagesOn December 8, 2025, Turkish troops entered northern Syria from Afrin, Ras al-Ain, and the northern Aleppo countryside a year after their chosen candidate, the Islamist militia Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), ended the Syrian civil war, ousting Ba’athist dictator Bashar al-Assad and installing HTS founder and leader Ahmad al-Sharaa as Syria’s interim president. Until recently, HTS was recognized as a terrorist organization by the United States, the U.N. Security Council, Canada, Turkey, and other countries. While current reporting frames the convoy’s entry primarily in terms of Turkey’s ongoing security posture in northern Syria, this is an insufficient understanding of Ankara’s escalation. A clearer picture emerges if one analyses Turkey’s Islamist policies, neo-Ottoman imperial aspirations, as well as energy security strategy. Northern Syria suffered neglectful, abusive, and divisive policies under the Assad regime, which did much to damage relations between the Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, Syriacs, Turkmen, Armenians, Circassians, and Yazidis living there. With tribal troubles going back decades and centuries, the region was rife with ethnic tensions even before the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011. That bloody conflict brought chaos to the north, opening the way for the brutal jihadist Islamic State (ISIS) to declare a caliphate with its capital in the town of Raqqa. The U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) coalition liberated Raqqa in 2017 and then became the militia component of what evolved into the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). Returning to Turkey, the AK Party, in power since 2002, is imposing an Islamist world view in combination with a nostalgic, neo-Ottoman foreign policy. However, one-fifth of the Turkish population is Kurdish, and Ankara has practiced policies aimed at assimilating the Turkish Kurds and suppressing their language and culture. At the same time, it fears the potential of a separatist movement.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), founded in 1978, initially sought to establish an independent Kurdish state, shifting its demands in 2005 to pursue greater cultural and political rights for Kurds within Turkey. PKK tactics included violent attacks against Turkish police and other regime targets. The organization is designated a terrorist entity by Turkey, the U.S., the EU, the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. The picture in Northern Syria is complicated. While the U.S. backs the SDF, from Ankara’s perspective, the SDF, as well as the AANES, are an extension of the PKK and constitute a threat. In 2019, Turkey conducted an incursion into Northern Syria called “Operation Peace Spring” targeting the SDF and bringing Ras al-Ain (Serekaniye), along with parts of northern Aleppo and the Tel Abyad–Ras al-Ain strip, under the control of Turkish-backed factions. Then, in March 2025, Syrian President al-Sharaa and Commander of the SDF General Mazloum Abdi reached an agreement to integrate “all civilian and military institutions” in Syria’s northeast into the Syrian state — not a development that Ankara looked on favorably if it meant that any perceived element of the PKK, which the SDF has sought to distance itself from, could become involved in Syria’s political process. In May 2025, responding to a direct call from its leader (in solitary confinement in a Turkish island prison since 1999), the PKK announced that it would abandon armed struggle, disband, and pursue attaining Kurdish rights by democratic means. As for the last two potentially stabilizing developments, the devil is in the detail, and long-held distrust resolves only slowly, if at all, especially in the Middle East. This brings us to early December 2025, when local media and observers reported that Turkish military convoys were once again on the move in Northern Syria through Ras al-Ain, with more than 20 heavy and medium vehicles entering the area overnight. This is an unusual development, as Turkish military movements in this region had previously typically occurred during the day and in smaller numbers.MORE FOR YOU This pipeline, moving natural gas from Turkey to war-torn northern Syria, is at the heart of both Turkey's wider energy strategy and its security objectives in northern Syria.Anadolu via Getty ImagesTurkey Coping with Spiraling Energy Demands Turkey’s electricity and natural gas demand growth rates are second only to China’s. The country’s overall energy consumption more than doubled between 2001 and 2021. GDP has increased steadily, with growth slowing during the pandemic years (1.3% in 2019, 1.8% in 2020), jumping sharply post-pandemic (11.8% in 2021) and then beginning to trend down but still showing solid growth (5.4% in 2022, 5.0% in 2023, 3.3% in 2024). As its electricity and natural gas demand accelerates, Ankara is being forced to confront the long-term risks associated with Turkey’s 74% reliance on foreign energy imports, mostly oil and gas. Being a major energy importer contributes to the state’s current account deficits as well as leaves the country exposed to potential price shocks, supply shortages, and potential political pressure from major suppliers. On Thursday, December 4, Turkey extended two of its expiring gas import contracts with Russia for another year, which will mean a supply of some 22 billion cubic meters over the coming year, or about 40% of Turkey’s total gas consumption in 2024. Russia’s last major natural gas market in Europe, Turkey is working to reduce its dependence on Russian-sourced gas and diversify its sources with long-term LNG contracts with US-based companies. Turkey is also exploring investments in the upstream U.S. market and is in talks with Chevron and Exxon. This approach was confirmed by Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar, who said that after the Turkish state-owned energy infrastructure and trading company BOTAS finalized its contracts with Russian counterparts, it would continue its partnership with Gazprom into next year but would focus on short-term contracts lasting about one year. As Ankara strives to transform Turkey into a gas trading hub, it has begun proactively diversifying its pipeline supply sources, expressing interest in increasing Turkmen gas imports through Iran and hedging its position as a U.S. LNG importer by investing upstream in U.S. gas production facilities. This past year, the U.S. became Turkey’s fourth-largest gas supplier, supplying 5.5 bcm, accounting for 14% of Turkey's gas imports. Bayraktar also stated that Turkey signed a one-year, 1.3 bcm gas agreement with Turkmenistan, an over 100% increase from the current level of 0.5 bcm. Ankara’s intense diversification of its gas supply and investment in LNG infrastructure reflect a growing awareness of its heavy dependence on foreign energy suppliers, especially Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Azerbaijan. Turkey has shifted towards the West and the Gulf states, particularly Qatar, which like Erdogan, supports the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, recognized as terrorist organizations by the U.S. and Europe. This will significantly affect Russia, further undermining its ability to wield energy as a political weapon. Linking Turkey’s Military Presence to Energy Security Ankara has increasingly tied its Syria policy to infrastructure security and cross-border stabilization. On May 21, 2025, Turkey completed a natural gas pipeline connecting Kilis in southern Turkey to Aleppo, an essential development in Ankara’s broader plans to support Syria’s reconstruction and potentially integrate Syrian gas demand into its emerging energy-hub vision. In statements earlier this year, Bayraktar described deepening security cooperation with Syria’s transitional administration as essential to protecting energy infrastructure and stabilizing Syria. From this perspective, military activity in northern Syria serves a dual purpose. It reinforces Turkey’s long-standing security objectives regarding Kurdish-led forces while also helping maintain stability in areas where Turkey is already expanding cross-border infrastructure, including pipelines. Northern Syria is a geographically sensitive zone: it sits near key transit areas and remains politically fragile and fragmented. Ensuring predictable activity there would be consistent with Ankara’s efforts to secure supply routes, protect new energy assets, and shape the environment in which its regional energy ambitions will unfold. This is also an opportunity for Turkey to undermine Russia’s re-entrenchment in Syria, which is even more important given Turkey’s pivot away from Russian gas supplies. Thus, Turkey’s recent military actions in Syria cannot simply be viewed through the narrow lens of security concerns. Instead, they must be understood as part of a broader strategy to assert itself as a key player in the regional energy landscape. By securing energy routes and reinforcing its military presence along its southern border, Ankara seeks not only to limit Kurdish aspirations for independence and self-determination but also to secure the infrastructure essential to its energy diversification goals. As the world’s reliance on Russian energy wanes and Turkey’s own energy demands climb while its role as an energy hub grows, its involvement in Syria will likely continue, blending military, economic, and geopolitical considerations in which the Kurds, U.S. allies for many decades, are the target and the likely victim. This shift underscores a critical moment in Turkish foreign policy. It is trying to balance between its aspirations as an aggressive regional superpower and becoming an energy hub in South-Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, Western Eurasia, and the Eastern Mediterranean, which requires peace, tranquility, and no problems with neighbors. How the invasion of Syria and destruction of the Kurds will play out with Ankara’s obligations to NATO and how its actions are received and responded to by the West remains to be seen. With energy demand growing and supply chains under increasing strain, Turkey’s moves in Syria will have to be carefully calibrated to avoid overplaying its hand and risk taking its energy game to the next level.